Oriana Bandiera, Andrea Pra, Raffaella Sadun. 2013. Managing the family firm: evidence from CEOs at work. Working Paper 19722 . National Bureau of Economic Research
Abstract: : CEOs affect the performance of the firms they manage, and family CEOs seem to weaken it. Yet little is known about what top executives actually do, and whether it differs by firm ownership. We study CEOs in the Indian manufacturing sector, where family ownership is widespread and the productivity dispersion across firms is substantial. Time use analysis of 356 CEOs of listed firms yields three sets of findings. First, there is substantial variation in the number of hours CEOs devote to work activities, and longer working hours are associated with higher firm productivity, growth, profitability and CEO pay. Second, family CEOs record 8% fewer working hours relative to professional CEOs. The difference in hours worked is more pronounced in low- competition environments and does not seem to be explained by measurement error. Third, difference in differences estimates with respect to the cost of effort, due to weather shocks and popular sport events, reveal that the observed difference between family and professional CEOs is consistent with heterogeneous preferences for work versus leisure. Evidence from six other countries reveals similar findings in economies at different stages of development.
The Time Use Survey;
Firm Data: Accounts——ORBIS (an extensive commercial data set that contains company accounts for the population of listed Indian firms)；Ownership data is collected in interviews；CEO Pay——PROWESS (an extensive commercial dataset focused on Indian
Industry Data：Lerner index
Shocks：Monsoon——http://www7.ncdc.noaa.gov/CDO/cdodata.cmd ；Cricket Games——2011 Indian Premier League (IPL) Cricket tournament
Conclusions:This paper investigates differences in hours worked by family CEOs and professional (i.e. nonfamily affiliated) CEOs. The main finding is that family CEOs work fewer hours. The difference is unlikely to be due to measurement error, because recorded hours of family CEOs include a greater shares of the activities that would be more likely to be underreported (unplanned meetings, one on- one meetings, activities with outsiders) and because the difference in hours worked decreases when the firm is subject to competitive pressure. Natural experiments - exposure to monsoon rain and cricket games - indicate that family CEOs are more responsive to shocks that increase the cost of providing effort. All these patterns can be accounted for by a difference in the preferences of family and professional CEOs, with the former placing a higher relative weight on leisure, which could be due to either a wealth effect or job security. The data also reveals a strong correlation between CEO hours and firm performance. While no causal inference can be made, combining this correlation with the effect of ownership on hours translates into a 5.8% productivity difference between family and professional CEOs. The behavioral difference is hence a potential candidate to account for the performance differential between family and non-family firms documented in the literature (Morck et al 2000, Villalonga and Amit 2006, Perez-Gonzalez 2006, Bennedsen et al. 2007, Bertrand et al 2008, Bertrand 2009).
More generally, the evidence presented here highlights the importance of how corporate leaders allocate their limited managerial attention (Milgrom and Geanakoplos 1991, Garicano and Prat 2013). Attention is a scarce resource and particularly so at the top of the organization. The allocation of time reflects the allocation of attention, which in turns depends on the strategic priorities of the CEO. The importance for effective corporate leaders of aligning their own time management to their goals has been a cornerstone of leadership theories for many years (Drucker 1966). According to Simon (1976), “attention is the chief bottleneck in organizational activity, and the bottleneck becomes narrower and narrower as we move to the tops of organizations.” The present paper provides evidence on the causes, features, and correlates of CEO attention allocation. We see this paper as a first step in a growing research agenda based on detailed information on the activities of CEOs. More research is necessary to understand the determinants and effects of the behavior of corporate leaders across low- and high-income economies.
结论：本研究调查了家族CEO与职业CEO在工作时间上的差异。发现家族CEO工作的时间更少。这样的差异并不像是测量误差造成的，因为家族CEO被记录的工作时间还包括记录外的活动（计划外的会议，一对一会面，与局外人的活动）以及因为当公司遭受竞争压力时工作时间下降的差异。自然实验——考虑到雨季和板球比赛——显示家族CEO更可能被外部冲击影响，当投入工作的机会成本变高的时候。这些内容都可以被归为家族CEO与职业CEO偏好的不同，前者更侧重休闲（可能是因为财富效应或职业安全感）。数据也解释了CEO工作时间与公司绩效和强力相关。 尽管不能随意做出推论，将这种相关与所有制想结合可以得出家族CEO与职业CEO间工作投入时间的差异可导致5.8% 的生产力差异。行为差异也因此是解释家族企业和非家族企业间绩效差异一个潜在的因素。